To Putin, Ukraine is a vital interest, part of Mother Russia to the U.S., it is important but not vital, and not an existential threat. One problem with drawing conclusions from the Ukraine crisis is that there is an asymmetry of interests. pivot to Asia has prompted many in Europe to worry about the future of the Trans-Atlantic relationship. In the Trump years, it seemed to many that the U.S. In the 1980s, fear of being surpassed by Japan was said to be a sign of decline. retreat from Vietnam in 1975, conventional wisdom was that the U.S. So, arguing that the weight of security challenges has shifted to the Pacific and that the Europeans should bear more of the burden in their region is a reasonable and necessary U.S. urging over the past 30 years, NATO is still lopsidedly dependent on U.S. The European Union, with a $17 trillion-plus GDP, rivaling China for the world’s second largest, and $225 billion overall defense spending, punches well below its weight. commitments to Europe versus those in the Indo-Pacific is legitimate, if overwrought. as a Pacific power, makes clear that the region tops the list of U.S. The White House’s recent Indo-Pacific Strategy Report, the latest iteration reaffirming the U.S. Biden’s response to Putin’s manufactured Ukraine crisis, mobilizing NATO allies, reflects the Western end of the Eurasia. Thus, nations can perceive a hierarchy of U.S. acts anywhere is how it will behave in all circumstances. In his recent book “ A Strategy of Denial,” Elbridge Colby uses the term “differentiated credibility,” as opposed to undifferentiated credibility - assuming that how the U.S. The network of alliances and partners in East Asia reflects that logic. Globally, since World War II, prevention of any hegemonic power or forces controlling the Eurasian landmass has been at the heart of U.S. interests have been consistent: freedom of navigation commercial access and opposing hegemonic forces. Since the empress of China sailed into Canton (now Guangzhou) harbor in 1784, U.S. legacy commitments and strengthen them elsewhere, particularly the Indo-Pacific. Indeed, notwithstanding how horribly it was executed, one could interpret the Afghan exit as a move to end some U.S. Other than combatting-terrorism, Afghanistan itself was never a U.S. commitments abroad are a function of national interests, some more important, and some more enduring, than others.Īfter 20 years of war, conceding the reality that it was unwinnable and that the U.S.-backed government in Kabul was not viable is not necessarily a sign of U.S. But all credibility is not equal, especially in a complex multipolar world.
credibility abroad is a timeworn favorite pastime for foreign policy wonks. and China, Taiwan is on a separate track from Ukraine. has security ties to Taiwan going back 70 years, intensifying now with U.S.-China strategic competition. has had no security relationship to Ukraine - one reason why President Biden ruled out sending U.S.
While Taiwan is understandably always anxiously watching U.S. Russian President Vladimir Putin’s grievances on Ukraine are longstanding, beginning with the collapse of the USSR in 1991 and NATO’s subsequent expansion eastward. credibility is linked to whatever happens just about anywhere. Listening to the chattering class, you’d think U.S. “China, Taiwan Closely watching Ukraine,” proclaimed a recent New York Times headline. What does the Ukraine crisis imply about the United States’s role in the world? “Biden’s withdrawal from Afghanistan emboldened Russia on Ukraine,” growled one irate critic.
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